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Abstract 
Security risks and outside interference of the traditional DV-HOP location algorithm have also 
been analyzed in detail. For its shortcomings such as low positioning accuracy, vulnerable to wormhole 
attack and block attacks, a new location algorithm for wireless sensor network security SDV-HOP is 
proposed. Firstly, a password-based symmetric encryption and authentication solutions are added in the 
distance vector exchange protocol to defend against masquerade attacks. In the key agreement phase, 
nodes and neighbor nodes generate a key set of common for communication through their respective key. 
Beacon node authentication is in communication process of encryption and transmission. Because initial 
key is distributed randomly, even if an attacker hijack a part of the node, it still cannot infer the key the rest 
of keys between nodes; Second, for attacks against the wormhole attack and blocking the safe handling , 
an average hop-based distance estimation algorithm is introduced. The appropriate distance value for 
each hop is selected by judging and comparing hop distance. And an effective jump distance is obtained 
by using the weighted average method .So it can avoid errors caused by wormhole attacks. Simulation 
experiments on Matlab simulation platform show that the security algorithm not only has high accuracy but 
also can effectively prevent and resist external attack, so the new algorithm has high security. 
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1. Introduction 
Niculescu et al. of Rutgers University used the principles of distance vector routing and 
GPS positioning to propose the DV-HOP location algorithm [1]. The algorithm is a distributed 
location algorithm which utilizes the idea of average. In the location process, the beacon nodes 
with GPS position-ing function communicate, and the average per-hop distances in networks 
are solved. Then unknown nodes find the minimum hop numbers of beacon nodes, and use the 
products of average per-hop distances and minimum hop numbers to represent the distance 
information between unknown nodes and beacon nodes. When an unkown node obtains the 
distance information of three or more beacon nodes, tri-/multi-lateral measurement and 
positioning is performed [2-6]. 
Traditional DV-HOP location algorithm is easily interfered or attacked by outside. For 
example, camouflage at-tacks can use malicious beacon nodes to send fake position 
information to networks to attack positioning applications. Moreover, if the hijacked nodes 
maliciously masquerade as key nodes or beacon nodes, the DV-HOP location algorithm does 
not work. Attackers can also directly remove nodes and cause computation error of average 
per-hop distances; or use interference of wormhole attack to induce unknown nodes to receive 
error positioning information, so that the minimum hop numbers are increased or reduced and 
the computation of beacon nodes is error, causing positioning failure. The attack models of DV-
HOP location algorithm are shown as follows. Figure 1 shows the normal situation without 
attacks. Figure 2 shows the situation where hop number is reduced by wormhole attacks. Figure 
3 shows the situation where hop number is increased by block attack. In attack models, the 
normal hop number between nodes A and B is 7, while the numbers under wormhole attack and 
block attack are 3 and 10, respectively [7, 8]. 
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Figure 1. Normal circumstances 
 
 
Figure 2. Wormhole Attack 
 
 
Figure 3. Block Attack 
                
 
In this study, a new secure location algorithm for wire-less sensor networks, SDV-HOP, 
is proposed. In the execution process of the algorithm, an encryption and authentication scheme 
based on symmetric codes is firstly introduced; then for wormhole attacks and block attacks, an 
average per-hop distance estimation algorithm based on security processing is introduced 
which determines and compares the hop distances to select appropriate averate hop distance 
values, effectively avoiding the error and mistakes caused by wormhole attacks [9, 10]. 
 
 
2. SDV-hop Secure Location Algorithm 
Based on DV-HOP algorithm, encryption and authentication mechanism is added into 
SDV-HOP algorithm, so that all received information is authenticated and only information that 
passes authentication is processed while that failed authentication is discarded. Moreover, the 
average per-hop distance estimation algorithm based on security processing is introduced, 
which determines the hop distances to select appropriate average distance values, enhancing 
the security. Through the encryption and authentication mechanism, and the average per-hop 
distance estimation algorithm, not only the positioning accuracy under secure environment is 
increased, but also the effect of masquerading attacks and wormhole attacks is effectively 
resisted, which shows a relatively high application value. 
 
2.1. Solution to Masquerading Attacks 
In masquerading attacks, attackers need to not only capture sensor nodes, but also 
crack the communication keys of the captured nodes and masquerade as beacon nodes. 
Masquerading attacks are extremely hazardous. If the same communication key is used in 
network, when the communication key of a certain node is cracked, the security of the whole 
network is threatened. Therefore, special encryption algorithm should be adopted in 
communication process, so that even attackers crack the keys of a part of nodes, the whole 
network is not affected. In DV-HOP algorithm, since the adopted sensor nodes are ordinary, and 
the computation ability and power consumption of each node are limited, therefore, encryption 
algorithms with large-scale computation cannot be adopted, and only symmetric code 
encryption algorithms with low computation complexity, fast speed and high efficiency can be 
used. The communication parties in traditional symmetric encryption algorithms use the same 
key, so that the security is not guaranteed, which is not applicable for DV-HOP algorithm. In this 
study, we focus on the characters of DV-HOP algorithm, and adopt improved symmetric code 
encryption algorithm to realize communication encryption. The basic idea is that: firstly, a 
shared key K0, a bilateral key generating function K(i,j), and a one-way key generating function 
h(x,y) are predefined for all unknown nodes and beacon nodes before they are placed. The so-
called one-way key generating function means that for almost all y within the value range of f, it 
is computationally infeasible to solve x, such that y = f( x ); while bilateral function means that it 
is possible to solve the value of definition domain from the value domain. The shared key K0 
can be obtained from one-way key generating function h(x,y), while h(x,y) is implemented by 
using Hash function. Hash function is a mapping, i.e., map the key word set to a certain address 
set. In the encryption process, x，y are firstly concatenated into m. Then hash(m) is used to 
generate a key K0 in which x，y cannot be reversely solved. Then the sending node and 
receiving node with neighboring nodes negotiate and agree on a key set for communication. 
Since in the initial stage, each node adopts random password allocation scheme to allocate a 
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key in key pool, therefore even attackers hijack a part of nodes, they can only crack the initial 
key of a part of nodes and cannot infer the key of other nodes. This guarantees the security of 
the whole sensor network, and attacks on some individual nodes will not cause the paralysis of 
the whole network. 
For example, if nodes A and B will communicate, then node A firstly generates a key Ka 
from the shared key K0 and the bilateral key generating function K(i, j), and spreads this key 
out. Meanwhile, node B use the same method to generates a key Kb and spreads it out. At this 
moment, i is expressed by a node identifier, and j is replaced by shared key K0. After node A 
receives Kb, the one-way key generating function h(x, y) is used for Ka and Kb to generate key 
Kab, in order to encrypt and spread the information to be sent by node A. After node B receives 
information, the one-way key generating function h(x, y) is similarly used for Ka and Kb to 
generate key Kab, and the information is decrypt-ed so that the information transmission 
between nodes A and B is realized. 
Before sensor networks communicate, encryption should be done. After encryption, the 
beacon nodes should be authenticated in the transmission process to prevent the hi-jacked 
nodes from masquerading as beacon message. Beacon node authentication is an important 
and complicated process. 
In encryption process, assume nodes a and b will communicate. The two valid beacon 
nodes use shared key K0, bilateral key generating function K(i,j) and one-way key generating 
function h(x,y) to generate a key Kab which can-not be used to reversely obtain x, y, and a key 
Kh. Kh is firstly used to encrypt the hash authentication code hash(ma) generated by the sent 
message ma. Then Kab is used to en-crypt again the data encrypted by key Kh and the 
message ma to be sent, and spread the encrypted messages. The unidirectionality of hash 
function guarantees that attackers can neither generate hash(mi)= hash(mj), nor generate key 
Kh1= Kh2, Kab1= Kab2. The hash list generation expressions of Kab and Kh are as follows: 
Ka=K(IDa,K0); Kb=K(IDb,K0);  Kab=h(Ka,Kb); Kh=h(IDa,K0); 
where 
Ka and Kb are the private keys of nodes a and b generated by bilateral key generating 
function K(i, j), respectively; 
Kab and Kh are the keys for communication encryption generated by key generating 
function h(x, y); 
IDa is the node identifier of node a to communicate; 
IDb is the node identifier of node b to communicate; 
At this moment, the format of the message La to be sent by a is La = EKab{maǁEKh 
hash(ma)}. EKh hash(ma) means using key Kh to encrypt the hash authentication code 
hash(ma) generated by message ma to be sent. EKab(maǁEKh hash(ma)) represents that key 
Kab is used to encrypt the message ma to be sent and EKh hash(ma). After node b receives 
broadcast message, key Kab is firstly used to decrypt the message, obtaining the message Ma 
sent by node a and EKh hash(ma). Then the node identifier IDa in the decrypted message and 
the local global shared key K0 are used to compute the private key of the source node Kh, in 
order to verify EKh hash(ma), thus parsing the hash authentication code hash(ma) of ma sent 
by node a. Finally, the hash authentication code hash(Ma) generated by the decrypted message 
Ma is used to verify the authentication code hash(ma) assigned to node a. The above process is 
expressed as follows: 
DKab(La); IDa=K-1(Ka,K0); Kh=h(IDa,K0); 
if (hash(Ma) )== hash(ma)) 
where 
DKab(La) represents encrypting the received message La using key Kab. 
IDa=K-1(Ka, K0) represents using the bilateral key generating function to reversely 
solve the beacon node identifier IDa. 
If hash(Ma)= hash(ma), then this message passes the authentication and is reserved 
for positioning calculation. The positioning results are output to the outside. At this moment, 
node a is considered as not attacked and a credible beacon node. Otherwise, if hash(Ma) ≠ 
hash(ma), then this message fails the authentication. Messages fail the authentication are 
directly discarded. 
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2.2. Average Per-Hop Distance Calculation Method Based on Security Processing  
Traditional DV-HOP location algorithm is easily interfered or attacked by outside world, 
so that the path length between nodes or hop numbers are changed, which causes large errors 
for the calculation of average per-hop distances. Therefore, it is necessary to select a relatively 
accurate aver-age per-hop distance to realize stable and reliable positioning. The proposed 
SDV-HOP algorithm determines the hop numbers and node path lengths to select appropriate 
per-hop distance values. It uses weighted average method to obtain a valid hop distance, 
effectively avoiding the errors and mistakes caused by wormhole attacks, and improving the 
positioning accuracy. Figure 4 shows the interference model of DV-HOP. 
In Figure 4, the paths between beacon node 1 and un-known nodes A, B are 
approximate straight lines. However, due to interference, block attacks or wormhole attacks, the 
paths to beacon nodes 2 and 3 are curved, while the paths to beacon nodes 4 and 5 contain 
holes, which reduce the hop numbers. The purpose of SDV-HOP algorithm is to reduce the 
positioning error caused by curved paths or wormholes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The interference model of DV-HOP algorithm 
 
 
To reduce as much as possible the error of average hop distance calculation caused by 
hop number changes, the security factors must be considered in the calculation of average per-
hop distance, and avoid the increase or decrease of average hop distance caused by hop 
number increase or decrease under the condition that the distance is constant. The detailed 
steps are as follows: (1) After each beacon node i receives the message sent by another 
beacon node j, Eq. (4-1) is used to calculate the average distance Cij between i and j, where hij 
represents the hop number between the node with ID i and the node with ID j, and hij=hji; (2) 
Selection is performed for the calculated Cij. The selection principle is to discard the cases in 
which the distance between two beacon nodes is very short but the hop number is very large, 
and the cases in which the distance is very long but the hop number is very small. In other 
words, to discard the abnormal per-hop distances which are relatively large or relatively small, 
remaining other hop distances for further processing; (3) Weighted average is applied to the 
remaining Cij, and the final result is the average per-hop distance Ci between beacon node i 
and the unknown node; (4) The unknown node records the per-hop distances of all the beacon 
nodes, and take the result of weighted average as the average per-hop distance of itself. The 
weights depend on the hop number between two beacon nodes, and are assigned according to 
the descending order of values; (5) When the unknown node obtains the average per-hop 
distance, a node multiplies the distance by the hop numbers to the adjacent beacon node to 
estimate the Euclidean distance, which is expressed by (1): 
 
D௜ ൌ ݄݋݌ݏ	x	ܿ௜         (1) 
 
(6) When an unknown node obtains the Euclidean distances of 3 or more beacon nodes, tri-
/multi-lateral measurement positioning is performed for the unknown node. 
In the next, beacon node 1 in Figure (4) is used as an exam-ple to briefly show the 
description of average hop distance calculation. There are 6 beacon nodes around beacon node 
1. By calculation, 6 hop distances, C12, C13, ..., C17, can be obtained. For the 6 hop distances, 
sort them from big to small. The median value is used as a reference, and com-pares each hop 
distance with this reference. Distances larger than 1.45 times of the reference value or less than 
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0.85 time of the reference value are discarded. The two thresholds, 1.45 and 0.85, are selected 
from large number of repeated experiments. Experimental results show that the two thresh-olds 
generate the smallest errors. In this study, the two thresholds are always set to the above 
values. Then C12, C13, C14, C15 are discarded, remaining C16 and C17. Then the average of 
the remaining is calculated and used as the average per-hop distance between beacon 1 and 
unknown nodes. Repeat the above steps until the distances between the other 6 beacon nodes 
and known nodes are all calculated. After unknown nodes A and B receive the hop distances 
sent by surrounding beacon nodes, the values are recorded and the weighted average is used 
as the hop distance of themselves. Finally, the hop numbers to beacon nodes are used to 
calculate the distances to beacon nodes. 
 
 
3. Analysis of Simulation Results 
To verify the location performance and the effectiveness of the defense measure of 
SDV-HOP secure location algorithm, MATLAB 7.0 simulation platform is used in this study and 
comparative analysis is performed to compare the SDV-HOP secure location algorithm and the 
traditional DV-HOP location algorithm. In the simulation process, nodes are randomly scattered 
in the region of 100m×100m. The random function is used to generate beacon nodes and 
unknown nodes, with the proportion of beacon nodes predefined and varying according to 
scenarios. In the whole simulation experiment, the communication radius of each node is 
assumed to be R=15m. For masquerading attacks and wormhole attacks, comparison between 
traditional DV-HOP location algorithm and SDV-HOP location algorithm is carried out, in terms 
of node density, beacon node proportion, the number and proportion of attacked beacon nodes, 
etc. The effect of these parameter changes on positioning accuracy is also verified. The 
simulation of each performance is the average of 150 random tests. The algorithm performance 
is mainly assessed in terms of location errors. Location errors are categorized into absolute 
errors and relative errors. Absolute errors only reflect the actual errors of individual nodes, while 
relative errors reflect the error of the whole network. 
Define the relative error of each node as er, which is ex-pressed as (4-3), where   is the 
actual node coordinates, and   is the coordinates estimated by the algorithm. The relative error 
is defined as the percentage ratio of the absolute coordinate error and the node communication 
radius. 
 
      (2) 
 
In the whole network, the average location error of nodes is defined as the ratio 
between the total error of all the located unknown nodes and the number of such nodes. The 
random scattering of sensor nodes is shown in Figure (5). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Random distribution of sensor nodes 
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Figure 5 is the node distribution map generated by the random function within the 
region of 100m×100m. The coordinates of each node is randomly generated, where the number 
of the beacon nodes is 10 and the ratio is 5%, represented by star (*). The number of unknown 
nodes is 190, and they are represented by dot (•). 
 
3.1. Simulation of Hop Distance Parameter Selection 
In security processing based average hop distance calculation method, the threshold 
selection plays an important role in hop distance screening. Too large or too small thresholds 
cause the increase of positioning error. Therefore, the reasonable selection of the threshold is 
the key of realizing minimum positioning error. Large numbers of experiments are carried out for 
threshold selection, and the reasonable threshold range is finally obtained. Figure 6 shows the 
simulation curve of hop parameter selection in security environment. 
 
 
         
Figure 6. Choose skip distance parameters 
 
 
In the simulation region, 200 nodes are randomly deployed. The proportion of beacon 
nodes is 10%, and the communication radius is R=15m. The X coordinate is the parameter 
lower limit value, the Y coordinate is the parameter upper limit value, and the Z coordinate is the 
positioning error under the corresponding parameters. As shown in the figure, when the lower 
limit and upper limit are 0.85 and 1.45, respectively, the positioning error is minimum, which is 
34.21%. 
Figure 7 is the simulation curve of hop distance parameter selection under wormhole 
attacks. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Choose skip distance parameters under Wormhole Attack 
 
 
In the simulation region, 200 nodes are randomly deployed. The proportion of beacon 
nodes is 10%, and the communication radius is R=15m. The X coordinate is the parameter 
lower limit value, the Y coordinate is the parameter upper limit value, and the Z coordinate is the 
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positioning error under the corresponding parameters. As shown in the figure, when the lower 
limit and upper limit are 0.85 and 1.45, respectively, the positioning error is minimum, which is 
41.34%. 
 
3.2. Positioning Performance Comparison of DV-HOP and SDV-HOP in Secure 
Environment 
Figure 8 shows the relation curves of positioning error versus beacon node proportion in 
secure environment for traditional DV-HOP and SDV-HOP algorithms. In the simulation region, 
200 nodes are randomly deployed, and the proportions of beacon nodes are 5%, 10%, …, 50%, 
with communication radius R=15m. The horizontal coordinate represents the proportion of 
beacon nodes, while the vertical coordinate represents the average positioning error. As shown 
in the figure, under the condition that there is no malicious attack, the average positioning error 
of both algorithms decreases with the increasing of beacon nodes. Moreover, the positioning 
accuracy achieves stable condition when the proportion of beacon nodes reaches 25%. It is 
clear in the figure that the positioning error of SDV-HOP is significantly lower than that of 
traditional DV-HOP, and the former reduces the error rate by 12.59% compared with the latter. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The affect of average positioning error on the ratio of beacon nodes change 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the effect of communication radius changes on average positioning 
error in secure environment for traditional DV-HOP and SDV-HOP algorithms. In the simulation, 
the same experimental conditions as the previous experiment are taken. A total of 200 nodes 
are randomly deployed in a region of 100m×100m, including unknown and beacon nodes. The 
proportion of beacon nodes is kept to 5% without changes. The communication radius of nodes, 
R, varies from 15m to 60m. The horizontal coordinate represents the communication radius of 
nodes, while the vertical coordinate stands for the average positioning error. As shown in the 
figure, under the condition that there is no malicious attack, the average positioning error of both 
algorithms decreases with the increasing of node communication radius. It is clear in the figure 
that the positioning error of SDV-HOP is significantly lower than that of traditional DV-HOP, and 
the former reduces the error rate by 6.59% com-pared with the latter. 
 
3.3. Positioning Performance Comparison of DV-HOP and SDV-HOP under Wormhole 
Attacks 
In wormhole attacks, two colluded nodes send information from a terminal to another 
terminal of the networks through a wormhole link. It will directly affect the hop numbers between 
nodes in DV-HOP location algorithm, changing the hop number and affecting the positioning 
accuracy. 
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Figure 9. The affect of average positioning error on the radius of beacon nodes change 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the relation curves of positioning error versus the proportion of beacon 
nodes for traditional DV-HOP and SDV-HOP algorithms. In the simulation, the total node 
number is 200 and unchanged. The number of beacon nodes increases continuously from the 
initial 5% to final 35%. In this period, the physical property of the beacon nodes does not 
change, with their communication radius being constantly 15m. The horizontal coordinate 
represents the proportion of beacon nodes, while the vertical coordinate represents the average 
positioning error. In the simulation, it is assumed that 10% of the beacon nodes whose hop 
numbers to other beacon nodes are larger than 3 suffer from wormhole attacks, which reduces 
their hop number by 3 and causes fake paths shorter than actual paths. As shown in the figure, 
under wormhole attacks, traditional DV-HOP has relatively high positioning error, largely 
affecting the positioning accuracy. Conversely, SDV-HOP has relatively low positioning error, 
which is able to satisfy the application where the positioning error requirement is not strict. This 
is because the proposed SDV-HOP algorithm adopts weighted average in implementation, and 
removes unreasonable hop distance values by judging and comparing hop distance values; so 
that the reasonable hop distance values are remained and used for positioning calculation. The 
proposed algorithm can effectively avoid the wormhole attacks with the purpose of reducing hop 
numbers. In the simulation, the error rate of SDV-HOP under wormhole attacks is 18.96% lower 
than that of DV-HOP. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The affect of average positioning error on the ratio of the beacon nodes change 
under wormhole attack 
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3.4. Positioning Performance Comparison of DV-HOP and SDV-HOP under Block Attacks 
Curved path can be formed due to obstacles in networks. Or in block attacks, attackers 
can change the communication distance by blocking communication or increasing transmission 
power, thus changing the relative relation between neighbors and causing positioning error of 
DV-HOP. Figure 11 shows the relation curves of positioning error versus total node number 
under block attacks for traditional DV-HOP and SDV-HOP algorithms. In the simulation region, 
the deployed node numbers are 150, 200, …, 450, and the communication radius is R=15m, 
with beacon node proportion 10% fixed. The horizontal coordinate represents total node 
number, while the vertical coordinate represents average positioning error. In the simulation, it is 
assumed that beacon nodes with 2 hops to another beacon node suffer from block attacks, 
which increase their hop numbers by 3. As shown in the figure, traditional DV-HOP has 
relatively high positioning error under block attacks, significantly affecting its positioning 
accuracy. However the error of SDV-HOP algorithm is relatively low and the error of it is 22.12% 
lower. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The affect of average positioning error on the number of nodes under wormhole 
attack 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the curves of average positioning error versus number of beacon 
nodes under block attacks for traditional DV-HOP and SDV-HOP algorithms. In the simulation 
region, 200 nodes are randomly deployed with the proportion of beacon nodes kept at 10% and 
communication radius R=15m. The horizontal coordinate represents the number of beacon 
nodes under block attacks, while the vertical coordinate represents average positioning error. In 
simulation, one to six beacon nodes are randomly selected. Assume that each beacon node 
with less than 8 hops to other nodes suffers from wormhole attacks, which increase its hop 
number by 4. As shown in the figure, the traditional DV-HOP has relatively high positioning 
error, significantly affecting its positioning accuracy. However, the error of SDV-HOP is relatively 
low, and the error rate is 21.32% lower. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. The affect of average positioning error on the number of wormhole attack nodes 
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4. Conclusions 
The security problem faced by traditional DV-HOP positioning algorithm is firstly 
analyzed. We focus on the attacks on DV-HOP, and propose SDV-HOP secure location 
algorithm. It adopts different encryption schemes and beacon node authentication technology 
for masquerading attacks. Moreover, the average hop distance calculation method based on 
secure processing is proposed to deal with worm-hole attacks and block attacks. Finally, 
through theoretical analysis and algorithm simulation, the conclusion is drawn that SDV-HOP 
algorithm can achieve relatively high positioning accuracy and effectively resist and defend 
masquerading attacks, wormhole attacks and block attacks. 
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